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A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS 
Sophia M. Robison* 
No one would deny that the FBI performs a vital function in in-vestigating, identifying, and tracking down suspects who may 
endanger the life, liberty, and property of Americans.1 However, this 
writer feels that the Uniform Crime Reports published by the FBI 
should be subjected to a very critical analysis. Of primary concern are 
the indiscriminate acceptance of the official data by legislators and 
social science investigators and the doubtful inferences which a 
frightened public draws from news releases proclaiming that "the 
U.S. is sitting on a seething volcano of crime."2 
To be sure, each official Uniform Crime Report includes a state-
ment that the FBI is only a channel for the reports from police juris-
dictions which agree to cooperate, and that it therefore cannot vouch 
for the validity of the data. Additional qualifying statements to the 
effect that the numerous causes of crime and variations in attendant 
community conditions make it unwise to compare one jurisdiction 
to another or one time period to another do not prevent the unini-
tiated reader from accepting· the figures at face value. The aura of 
authenticity which accompanies a report issued under the seal of 
the United States Government obscures for the observer unsophisti-
cated in interpreting statistics the FBI's disclaimer of responsibility 
for the accuracy of the data. Such disclaimers of responsibility for 
the accuracy of the original data and the tendency of the FBI to 
treat the Reports as though they were infallible violate the basic 
requirements for sound inference and for scientific detachment 
which one has the right to expect from a government agency. 
The inciting incident which triggered this article was the writer's 
unacademically phrased statement that "the F.B.I.'s figures are not 
worth the paper they are printed on," which was made during a 
telephone conversation with a New York Times reporter. In an un-
expected press release the next day,3 the reporter quoted the writer 
exactly and added comments expressed by other persons. Roy A. 
Wilkins, executive director of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, criticized the FBI breakdown of 
• Professor Emeritus, School of Social Work, Columbia University.-Ed. 
I. For an account of the origin and major responsibilities of the FBI, see DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, THE STORY OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (undated). 
2. Newsday, Garden City, New York, Sept. 23, 1965, Center Section, p. _le. 
3. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1965, p. 14. 
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arrests into Negro and white; he was quoted as saying that "Negro 
arrests, in the public mind, become Negro crimes."4 New York City's 
Deputy Police Commissioner, Joseph G. Martin, who was in charge 
of community relations, had no comment except the laconic state-
ment that "the figures speak for themselves."5 However, just as such 
abstract concepts as democracy, freedom, and liberty do not convey 
the same ideas to all persons, every sophisticated statistician knows 
that figures do not speak for themselves. 
Who can blame the "man in the street" if he is impressed by the 
title in large letters, Crime in the United States, with the seal of 
the United States Department of Justice? It is no wonder that he 
is frightened by the Crime Capsules in the initial summary, which 
convey the impression that serious crime is increasing at a greater 
rate than the population and that juvenile crime is rising spectac-
ularly. According to the Crime Capsules in the 1960 report: 
[C]rime continued its upward surge, 14 percent over 1959. First 
year of the sixties recorded a new all-time high, with 98 percent 
more crime than in 1950. . . . Crime continued to outstrip 
population growth over 4 to I. ... Arrests of persons under 18 
more than doubled since 1950, while population of youths, ages 
10-17, increased by less than one-half.6 
According to the Crime Capsules in the 1964 report: 
Arrests for all criminal acts, excluding traffic, increased 5 per-
cent over 1963. For persons under 18 arrests up 17 percent .... 
National crime rate: 14 serious offenses per 1,000 inhabitants 
in 1964 .... Since 1958 crime has increased 6 times faster than 
our population growth.7 
Little wonder that the average citizen, even if he refers to the 
entire report and not just to the press release, pays little attention to 
the body of the report, which in addition to the seven "Index Crimes" 
(in order of their seriousness: criminal homicide, forcible rape, rob-
bery, aggravated assault,, burglary, larceny, and auto theft) lists a 
much larger series-the "Arrest Series"-based on arrests for a 
wide range of behavior (including assaults other than aggravated 
assault, vandalism, carrying and possessing weapons, and vagrancy), 
assumed to be less serious than the Index Crimes. 
The public influence of the Reports is of course not limited to 
their direct effect on the "man in the street"; the Reports' influence 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTS 1 (1960) [hereinafter cited as REPORTS]. 
7. 1964 REPORTS 1. 
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on the attitudes of the ·public press is also substantial. One can 
hardly blame the newspaper reporter £or turning to official reports 
when news is scarce and he is assigned to that hardy perennial, crime 
and delinquency. After all, unlike subjects such as solid state physics, 
Einstein's theories, or the wonders of the electro-magnetic tape, 
crime is something about which nearly everyone has an opinion and 
with which everyone thinks he has had some experience. 
I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 
It is important to keep in mind that the Reports were originated 
with a view toward providing data which would help the police judge 
their effectiveness in carrying out their responsibilities. In 1927 the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) assigned respon-
sibility for establishing uniform crime records to an official com-
mittee. Under the direction of Bruce Smith, a well-known police 
consultant and staff member of the Institute of Public Administra-
tion in New York City, and Lent D. Upson, of the Detroit Bureau 
of Governmental Research, a complete manual for police entitled 
Uniform Crime Reporting was published by the IACP. In 1930 
Congress, after conferring with the Bureau of Prisons, assigned to 
the FBI the responsibility for collecting the data according to the 
manual and £or issuing reports. In recent years these reports have 
been issued annually. Preliminary three-page quarterly reports con-
taining current information are also published. 
Shortly after Congress delegated this responsibility to the FBI, 
Professor Warner commented that in light of the somewhat question-
able source of the data, the Department of Justice might do more 
harm than good by issuing the Reports, since this. material would 
serve as a basis for influencing public opinion and legislation. 8 Pro-
fessor Warner also made the incisive observation that "if the Federal 
Government is to maintain its present reputation for the accuracy 
of its statistics, it must stand by the slogan: 'Better no statistics, thm 
false statistics!' "9 In 1958, the FBI appointe<;I an advisory committee, 
under the direction of Professor Peter P. Lejins, chairman of the 
Department of Sociology at the University of Maryland, to report 
on the validity of Thorsten Sellin's widely quoted comment about 
national crime statistics: "The United States has the worst criminal 
8. Warner, Crimes Known to the Police-An Index of Crime?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 
207 (1921). 
9. Id. at 220. 
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statistics of any major country in the Western World."10 The recom-
mendations of that committee and the actions taken on them by the 
FBI will be discussed later. 
There will undoubtedly be more recommendations by President 
Johnson's recently appointed United States Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice. If, however, these recom-
mendations are based on inadequate statistics, they can hardly be 
expected to result in more effective methods of control and pre-
vention of crime than the admittedly ineffective methods in current 
use. 
In the following discussion, the writer has resisted the tempta-
tion to rework the FBI's statistics,11 because the published form of 
the Reports makes it practically impossible to follow the data from 
one series to the next (that is, offenses known to the police, clearances, 
arrests, and final disposition) and to assess the use of estimates and 
absolute numbers. Instead, an attempt will be made to review the 
Reports of the past five years for answers to three questions which 
appear to be crucial in appraising the statistics: 
I: What is the source of the data? 
2: What do the statistics mean? , 3: How sound are the inferences drawn from the statistics? 
Finally, specific suggestions for the improvement of the Uniform 
Crime Reports will be made . 
. II. SOURCE OF THE DATA 
The tw<J federal agencies which distribute national statistics on 
crime and delinquency are the FBI and the Children's Bureau. 
Neither agency assumes responsibility for the accuracy of the figures, 
since both act only as intermediaries which compile data voluntarily 
submitted by the local contributing agencies. It is essential also in 
considering the validity of our crime and delinquency statistics to 
bear in mind that, like our public school systems, our health services, 
and our juvenile court procedures, the setup of our police services 
is by no means uniform from state to state or even from community 
to community within a single state. The doctrine of states' rights 
and its sequel-the resistance to so-called federal control-is a pecu-
liarly American phenomenon which impedes most attempts to secure 
10. As quoted in Wallace, Crime in the United States, Life, SepL 9, 1957, p. 49. 
11. For an admirable exposition of this approach, see Wolfgang, Uniform Crime 
Reports: A Critical Appraisal, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 708 (1963). 
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nation-wide, or sometimes even state-wide, cooperation. Thus, be-
cause the individual states are autonomous in broad areas of politicar 
and administrative responsibility, national data on the operations 
of the police, which the central governments in some European 
countries collect automatically, are not available for the United 
States. 
Recognizing the problems noted here, both the FBI and the 
Children's Bureau have made continuous efforts to improve the 
geographic coverage, accuracy, and completeness of the individual 
reports.12 An indication of the continuing efforts of the FBI to im-
prove the geographic coverage of its statistics is the increase in the 
number of letters and visits. In 1959 the Bureau sent out 4,500 letters 
to local reporting officials, asking questions about details of their 
reports and offering assistance in making the reports conform to 
the required procedures outlined in the official manual. In 1964 
more than 19,000 letters were written, and hundreds ·of personal 
visits were made by specially trained FBI officers. 
The following discussion is an account of what happens in New 
York City, where the reporting procedure is fairly typical of large 
metropolitan areas. Citizens' reports of criminal activity may be made 
either to a central police headquarters or to the local police precinct. 
If such a report is made to headquarters, it is transferred immediately 
to the appropriate precinct. Each complaint receives a serial number. 
If the situation warrants an investigation, the complaint is assigned 
to a detective who is required to report his findings within seventy-
two hours. Monthly summary reports are prepared in the precinct 
offices and forwarded to the city headquarters, which in turn trans-
mits them to Washington and to the New York State Department of 
Correction. The New York City office, like other large metropolitan 
centers, has the advantage of computers and other data processing 
equipment in its Statistics and Records Bureau. 
In Philadelphia during the interval between 1951 and 1953 the 
local reports showed a seventy per cent increase in serious offenses. 
This apparent increase in the numbers of crimes was not the result 
of an invasion of the city by criminals; it was the consequence of a 
failure in 1951 of one police district in the center of the city to in-
clude five thousand complaints in its report. On the basis of the re-
vised reports, the actual increase was found to be thirty per cent for 
12. For a description of the improvements in the reporting procedures of the 
United States Children's Bureau, see ROBISON, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY-ITS NATURE AND 
CONTROL 17•18 (1960). . 
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the three-year period. The city's installation of a central reporting 
system in 1953 has presumably improved the reliability of its crime 
reports.13 
As may have been the case in the Philadelphia incident, under-
reporting may reflect a feeling of obligation on the part of the police 
to protect the reputation of their department and their city. Cressey 
notes that when this goal cannot be accomplished under the existing 
legal and administrative machinery, it may be done with statistics.14 
In a series of articles on crime in ·a Long Island daily,10 this 
:writer's remark that the FBI statistics "are not worth the paper they 
are written on" was quoted. A recently retired New York City police 
officer, incensed at the comment, sent this ·writer a letter. The letter 
began with a paean of praise for Mr. Hoover. The officer assumed 
that the criticism of the FBI statistics implied that crime was actually 
less prevalent than the published statistics indicated. He referred 
to the refusal by the FBI to accept New York City's crime statistics 
for the years 1948 to 1952-because, in his terms, "they were so 
badly juggled." Despite the setting up of a new system, however, 
the retired officer claimed that the New York City statistics have again 
hit the depths in "covering up." In other words, he validated the 
premise of this article that the data are really nonrepresentative of 
the crime picture, either currently or comparatively. He stated: 
There's a very famous detective who works in every station house 
in N.Y.C. His name is detective "Can" and that's where all the 
reported crimes go whenever possible ..... I've consigned hun-
dreds of cases to detective "Can." You don't do this to get out 
of doing your job, but rather to keep the "squeal rate" down 
· and make the boss look good and this goes on right up to the 
P.C. [police captain]. 
The ... [precinct] ... is a masterpiece of statistics juggling. 
The Capt. wouldn't last two days ... if every crime was entered 
on the UF 61 sheet that was reported in person or on the phone. 
I was present one night when the Captain of the . . . [pre-
cinct] ... said, "Don't put in any more burglaries for the rest 
of the month." ... [I]t was then about the 25th or 26th of the 
month. If a crime (burglary) is not covered by insurance, it 
seldom gets entered as a burglary, but rather as petit larceny or 
malicious mischief (damage to door). If it's covered by insurance 
then it has to go in as is.16 
13. See BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 138 (1959). 
14. See Cressey, The State of Criminal Statistics, 3 J, NAT'L PROBATION &: PAROLE 
Ass'N 231 (July 1957). 
15. Newsday, Garden City, New York, Sept. 23, 1965, Center Section, p. le. 
16. Widespread practices of the type discussed in this letter have recently come to 
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In a personal conversation granted at the writer's request, the 
officer reiterated that he believed his comments represented a. con-
sensus of the officers in other precincts. He stated that if the com-
plainant was not covered by insurance, the possibility of the com-
plaint's going into the "can" file was great. There was a tendency also 
to scale down the complainant's estimate of the amount of loss, even 
if it was covered by insurance. 
He further commented on the difficulty that a detective might 
experience in carrying out the assignment for immediate investiga-
tion .. Detectives work in three shifts, and, as Mr. Mills has pointed 
out,17 the police officer may postpone some tasks which require his 
appearance in court at inconvenient times or encroach on his leisure 
time. 
No doubt other police officers could add their testimony as to 
the practices which affect the recording of crime. At this point it 
would seem that there is sufficient testimony to suggest the exercise 
of caution in taking the FBI's published statistics at "face value." 
Further criticism of the statistics will be postponed until after 
an evaluation of the data to answer the second question-what do 
the figures stand for? 
III. MEANING OF THE FBI STATISTICS 
There is a generally accepted assumption that acts reported to 
the police provide an appropriate basis for judging not only the · 
total amount of crime but also the relative incidence and importance 
of specific types of criminal activity. In this regard, the primary 
distinction made by the FBI is based on the degree of seriousness 
of particular types of criminal acts. Since 1959 the crimes formerly 
designated "Part I Offenses," which are assumed to be the most 
serious, have been labeled "Index Crimes." They are subclassified 
in descending order of seriousness as follows: 
the attention of high police officials in New York City, and measures are being taken 
in an attempt to ensure more accurate reporting of police statistics in the future. 
See N.Y. Times, April 5, 1966, p. I, cols. 2-3; p. 28, cols. 5-8: 
Chief Inspector Sanford D. Garelik, who put out the order calling for better 
statistics, declared at the time that "self-serving" officials had tended to report 
crime in their jurisdictions as being less serious than it really was. 
High police officers said yesterday that burglaries had sometimes been "canned" 
. (not recorded in police statistics) or had been recorded as petty larceny or lost 
property. Similarly, they said, robbery complaints had sometimes been downgraded 
to petty larceny or disorderly conduct. 
17. Mills, The Detective, Life, Nov. 26, 1965, pp. 90D-123. 
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Crimes Against The Person 
I. Criminal Homicide 
a. Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter 
b. Negligent manslaughter · 
2. Forcible rape 
3. Robbery 
4. Aggravated Assault 
Crimes Against Property 
5. Burglary 
6. Larceny 
a. Larceny of property valued at $50 or more 
b. Larceny of property valued at less. than $50 
7. Automobile theft 
The Arrest Series, formerly known as "Part II Offenses," is 
comprised of less serious offenses. This category includes approxi-
mately twenty offenses beginning alphabetically with arson and 
ending with "weapons; carrying, possessing, etc." 
It is essential to understand that the basis of the count in the 
two series differs. For the Index Crimes, offenses known to the 
police are the recorded units, and thus at the time of reporting 
there is no indication as to how many persons may have been 
involved in the criminal transaction. Furthermore, some of these 
persons may have been involved in other offenses during the course 
of the year which is covered by the Report. In contrast, the Arrest 
Series is based on arrests of persons who have been charged with any 
of the offenses relegated to that series. 
The Arrest Series offers the only available base for estimating the 
relative number of individuals involved in crimes listed under 
either series, but unfortunately the number of cities or agencies 
reporting differs not only from year to year but also from tabulation 
to tabulation. Disregarding these limitations, one can infer that 
among the four offenses designated by the Index series as crimes 
against the person, criminal homicide is credited with the highest 
percentage of clearance by arrest-approximately ninety per cent.18 
Aggravated assault is second with about a seventy-five per cent clear-
ance rate. In marked contrast, the highest percentage of clearance 
among the three Index Crimes against property is assigned to robbery 
(approximately forty per cent),10 and the lowest clearance rate is 
18. 1963 REPORTS 21 (chart 8). 
19. Ibid. 
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ascribed to larceny (nventy per cent).20 In each of the years studied, 
the less serious crimes accounted for approximately eighty-five per 
cent of the total arrests. 
It should be obvious by now that to attempt to follow the raw 
data of the FBI reports from one stage to another presents a severe 
challenge to one's frustration tolerance. 
A. Specific Definitions and Incidence of Selected Index Crimes 
A general discussion of each of the seven Index Crimes would 
carry this article beyond its intended scope. In addition, more 
benefit may be derived by concentrating on the definitions and 
incidence of homicide, burglary, larceny, and automobile theft. 
I. Criminal homicide.-(a) Murder and nonnegligent man-
slaughter: all willful felonious, homicides as distinguished 
from deaths caused by negligence. Excludes attempts to 
kill, assaults to kill, suicides, accidental deaths, or justifiable 
homicides .... (b) Manslaughter by negligence: any death 
which the police investigation establishes was primarily 
attributable to gross negligence of some individual other 
than the victim.21 
Criminal homicide is designated as the most serious of the Index 
Crimes. The totals for this crime (murder and nonnegligent man-
slaughter only) rose from 8,583 offenses in 1959 to 9,249 in 1964;22 
the lowest figure was 8,404 in 1962.23 However, ·criminal homicide 
has never accounted for more than one half of one per cent of the 
total Index Crimes, and in 1964 this offense comprised only 0.35 per 
cent of the total.24 
2. Burglary-breaking or entering.-Burglary, housebreaking, 
safecracking, or any unlawful entry to commit a felony or a 
theft, even though no force was used to gain entrance and 
attempts. Burglary followed by larceny is not counted again 
as larceny.25 
In marked contrast to criminal homicide, the FBI totals for 
burglary increase from 685,862 in 1959 to 1,110,458 in 1964.26 
However, stated as a percentage of total Index Crimes, the incidence 
20, Ibid. 
21, Id. at 43. 
22. 1959 REPORTS 34 (table 2); 1964 REPORTS 51 (table 2). 
23. 1962 REPORTS 35 (table 2). 
24. 1964 REPoRTS 50 (table 2). 
25. 1963 REPORTS 44. 
26. 1959 REPORTS 35 (table 2); 1964 REPORTS 51 (table ~). 
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of this offense remained practically the same-43.1 per cent in 1959 
and 42.6 per cent in 1964.27 
3. Larceny-theft (except auto theft).-(a) Fifty dollars and 
over in value; (b) under $50 in value. Thefts of bicycles, 
automobile accessories, shoplifting, pocket-picking, or any 
stealing of property or article of value which is not taken 
by force and violence or by fraud. Excludes embezzlement, 
"con" games, forgery, worthless checks, etc.28 
The totals for larceny (fifty dollars and over in value) increased 
from 403,426 in 1959 to 704,536 in 1964.29 However, as in the case 
of burglary, the relative increase in larcenies was very slight-from 
25 per cent of the total Index Crimes in 1959 to 27 per cent in 
1964.30 . 
4. Auto theft.-Stealing or driving away and abandoning a 
motor _vehicle. Excludes taking for temporary use when 
actually returned by the taker or unauthorized use by those 
having lawful access to the vehicle. 81 
The number of automobile thefts increased from 288,337 in 
1959 to 462,971 in 1964,82 representing 12 per cent of the total 
Index Crimes in 1959 and 17 per cent in 1964.38 
Using the latest figures, those for 1964, it appears that the three 
crimes against property (burglary, larceny, and auto theft) account 
for approximately seven eighths of all the Index Crimes. 
B. Inconsistencies in the Labeling Procedure 
Although the above captions-criminal homicide, robbery, lar-
ceny, and auto theft-may appear to the unwary reader to be mu-
tually exclusive, there is no assurance that either these or the other 
• offense categories are always uniformly applied. Some of the incon-
sistencies are the result of occasional changes in procedure, and others 
are related to the factor of discretion in applying the labels. An 
example of the difficulty caused by changes in procedure may be 
found in the current trend toward discarding customary legal terms, 
such as felony and misdemeanor, and substituting more specific 
and descriptive categories, such as the ones described above. Some 
27. 1959 REPORTS 34-35 (table 2); 1964 REPORTS 50-51 (table 2). 
28. 1963 REPORTS 44. 
29. 1959 REPORTS 35 (table 2); 1964 REPORTS 51 (table 2). 
30. 1959 REPORTS 34-35 (table 2); 1964 REPORTS 50-51 (table 2). 
31. 1963 REPORTS 44. 
32. 1959 REPORTS 35 (table 2); 1964 REPORTS 51 (table 2). 
33. 1959 REPORTS 34-35 (table 2); 1964 REPORTS 50-51 (table 2). 
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jurisdictions, such as New York City, still use the terms inter-
changeably. 
With respect to the second source of inconsistency, discretionary 
labeling, there is, unfortunately, no assurance that all jurisdictions 
affix the same labels to similar offenses. For example, drunkenness 
is sometimes regarded as disorderly conduct or vagrancy. Moreover, 
the directions in the FBI police manual specify that only the most 
serious offense committed during the course of a single criminal 
transaction can be listed for tabulation. Thus, a situation involving 
aggravated assault combined with burglary must be recorded as 
simply a case of aggravated assault. It should be evident that this 
procedure may easily obscure the severity of the criminal behavior, 
as does the process in some jurisdictions of persuading defendants 
to plead guilty to a lesser offense in situations where several criminal 
acts were committed. 
An additional element of imprecision in the labeling procedure 
is created by the use of a catch-all category for miscellaneous offenses. 
This vague classification is particularly distressing to sophisticated 
statisticians. A final, and perhaps even more indefensible, practice is 
the inclusion of "attempted" criminal acts in each of the categories 
without indicating the number of occurrences. 
C. Incompleteness of the Reports 
In addition to the foregoing variations in the application of 
labels, another weakness of the Reports is a result of the numerous 
categories of ·wrongdoing which are either wholly or partially 
omitted from the FBI statistics. In. this regard, it should be noted 
that the FBI statistics do not include violations of federal laws. 
A more important omission, however, is the large category of pic-
turesquely named "white collar" crimes. Professor Sutherland has 
published a documented study in which he discusses the widely 
adopted practices for handling such obviously antisocial acts as 
misrepresentation in advertising, restraint of trade, and manipula-
tion of prices and markets, so that persons in the upper socio-
economic strata will not acquire police records. 34 Moreover, if the 
complainant in such cases decides to go to court, the proceedings 
are ordinarily conducted in civil rather than criminal courts. Clinard 
34. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLI.AR CRIME (1949). Similarly, although the defendants 
in the recent electrical equipment conspiracies were charged with criminal offenses, 
the unlawful activities involved in those cases will not be included in the Reports. 
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discusses another form of antisocial behavior which is not reflected 
in the Reports-the defiance of wartime administrative regulations.81s 
Like the "business crimes" of well-to-do corporate executives, 
the antisocial behavior of youths from privileged communities is 
rarely labeled as criminal activity. On the occasions when such con-
duct does receive the attention of public officials, any resulting 
judicial proceedings are frequently dismissed, as the news reports 
of last year's incidents in Darien, Connecticut, and Newport, Rhode 
Island, illustrate. Similar behavior by youths who live on the wrong 
side of the tracks, especially if they belong to minority groups, is 
much more likely to "result in a police report and some form of 
punishment. To the statement, rarely does the rich man go to jail 
or hang, can be added-rarely does his son or daughter appear in 
FBI or Children's Bureau statistics. 
Hidden delinquency, which has received very little attention 
from public officials, is another type ·of omission from official crime 
statistics. If the community's concern is not confined merely to 
punishing criminals who are ultimately caught, attention should 
also be directed to the incidence of unlabeled, hidden delinquency 
and crime whose perpetrators have succeeded in overcoming their 
youthful transgressions and are currently leading useful lives in 
the community. 
A preliminary report of the exploratory phase of the Career Pat• 
terns Project, which retraces the youthful careers of a cross-section 
of currently respectable males between the ages of thirty and sixty, 
reveals that three fourths of them acknowledged behavior which 
could have earned them an official label of delinquent or criminal.86 
Personal interviews with these subjects have yielded data on family, 
school, occupation, and leisure time relationships. The objective 
is to identify the crucial combination of factors associated with the 
occurrence and disappearance of antisocial behavior. The prelimi-
nary findings of these studies were sufficiently challenging to suggest 
further and more intensive studies on larger samples. Even more 
important, no information of this type is currently contained in the 
FBI's statistical reports. 
In brief, the answer to the question as to the meaning of the 
statistics is that the FBI's definitions of specific crimes are neither 
uniformly applied nor sufficiently inclusive. 
35. See CLINARD, THE BLACK MARKET-A STUDY OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1952). 
36. See Robison & Levine, The Adolescent Behavior of the Currently Respectable 
Male-A Study of the Youthful Delinquent Behavior of Men Who Today Are Re-
spectable Members of Society, Nat'l Institute of Mental Health, Grants 0M78l• 
MH00781-03, Oct. 1961-Dec. 1964 (March 1965). 
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JV. VALIDITY OF THE INFERENCES DRAWN BY THE FBI 
FROM ITS STATISTICS 
1043 
To continue the critical review, answers are needed not only 
to the first ~vo questions concerning the source and meaning of the 
statistics, but also to the third question, regarding the validity of 
the inferences which are drawn from these figures. 
In a letter of transmittal dated September 29, 1958, Dr. Lejins, 
speaking for the Advisory Committee on Uniform Crime Reporting, 
which was composed of himself, Dr. Charlton F. Chute, Director of 
the Institute of Public Administration in New York City, and Stan-
ley R. Schrotel, Chief of Police at Cincinnati, Ohio, stated that the 
Uniform Crime Reporting Program is "the most important segment 
of the nationwide criminal statistics published in the United States."87 
Dr. Lejins also noted that time limits restricted the scope of the 
Advisory Committee's inquiry to "considering certain specific issues 
which were of primary concern to the staff engaged in the produc-
tion of the Reports."38 Preceding and following the official report of 
the Advisory Committee, critics of the Reports raised questions and 
made comments. Primarily sociologists and criminologists and an oc-
casional magazine writer or executive of a state welfare commission, 
these critics expressed concern with respect to the .following subjects: 
classification and designation of crimes on the basis of their serious-
ness, official statements about juvenile crime, the basis for calculation 
of crime rates, and the use of "crime clocks.". The following discus-
sion will relate these comments, where appropriate, to the recommen-
dations of the Advisory Committee and to the subsequent action 
taken by the FBI. 
A. Classification on the Basis of Seriousness 
A great deal of criticism has been directed at the Bureau's classi-
fication of crimes according to an estimate of the seriousness of the 
conduct involved. We have already touched upon three aspects of 
such a designation: lack of clarity in definition, lack of uniformity 
in applying labels, and the Bureau's rule that only one crime (in 
order of the established hierarchy) committed during the course of 
a transaction may be used as the basis for tabulation.39 Furthermore, 
such offenses as arson, kidnapping, and assault and battery, which 
are excluded from the Index Crimes, may in fact involve more per-
37 • .ADVISORY COMM. ON UNIFORM CRIME RECORDS, INT'L Ass'N OF CHIEFS OF Pouc:e, 
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 8 (Special Issue 1958). 
38. Ibid. 
39. See discussion in section III(B) supra. 
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sonal injury than rape, aggravated assault, or some of the crimes 
against property which are included in the Index. The validity of 
this assertion is borne out by the results of a special study conducted 
by Sellin and Wolfgang to investigate a large sample of offenses 
known to the Philadelphia police in 1960.40 The objective of the 
study was to provide a sounder basis for classifying crimes than the 
one currently being used by the Uniform Crime Reporting Program. 
With respect to several of the categories of crime, erroneous 
impressions have been created about the significance of the Index 
Crimes, either as a result of faulty classification or as a result of 
unrealistic calculation of the rate of incidence of the crimes. In this 
regard, the categories of automobile theft and murder are particu-
larly misleading. 
The Advisory Committee, in discussing the category of auto-
mobile thefts, suggested that a distinction be made between borrow-
ing a car for a joyride, the usual juvenile offense, and stealing a 
car for a getaway from the scene of a crime or for stripping and 
resale, which are likely to be adult offenses. It is reported that the 
FBI did not accept this suggestion because it was felt that there is 
no reason to distinguish between these acts, since any unpermitted 
taking deprives a person of the use of his property, even if only for 
a short period of time. In addition, the Bureau felt that a system 
of separate classification might encourage the juvenile crime of 
joyriding. 
Fear of death by murder is undoubtedly increased by the FBI re-
ports and news releases. In this respect, certain misconceptions about 
the situation in New York City are of special interest. Police reports 
for the year 1964 contradict the popular theory that most murders in 
New York are committed by strangers running rampant in the streets. 
Almost two thirds of the 637 murders reported in that year took 
place indoors.41 In about one fourth of these cases, the slayer was 
in some way "related" to the victim-most often a common-law 
wife or husband.42 The second largest group of intra-family slayings 
involved parents who murdered their sons or daughters.4B 
An internationally recognized authority recently made the com-
forting disclosure that criminal homicide is not increasing but is 
actually on the decrease. James V. Bennett, former director of the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons and chairman of the United Nations Con-
40. See SllLLIN &: WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964). 
41. See N.Y. Times, April 12, 1965, p. 28, col, 5. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid. 
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ference on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders held 
in London in 1960, stated: 
In the past thirty-odd years, the homicide rate has been cut 
nearly in half, dropping from 8.9 per 100,000 of our civilian 
population in 1930 to 5.1 in 1962 .... The actual number of 
homicides declined for a time from the 10,500 that were re-
corded in 1930, and later rose again. In 1962 the total reached 
only 9,500 although the population had increased 50 percent 
since 1930. We may conclude that the life of the ordinary citi-
zen is a good deal safer than it used to be-despite the contrary 
impression created by headlines. 44 
To counteract the current justifiable objections to the designa-
tion of the present Index crimes as the most serious forms of criminal 
activity, the Advisory Committee suggested a new three-part classifica-
tion: (1) a general tabulation of offenses which are recorded as they 
become known to the police, (2) offenses used for the purposes of the 
Crime Index, and (3) offenses that are singled out as being at the 
given time of special importance to the police departments in their 
work. 
B. Statements About Juvenile Crimes 
In spite of the FBI's acknowledgment that its coverage of juvenile 
crimes is incomplete, that there is overlapping with other juris-
dictions, and that the police handling of juvenile offenders differs 
widely in different communities, practically all the FBI reports 
emphasize the increasing incidence of crime in the juvenile popula-
tion. An example of the emphasis upon juvenile crime can be seen 
in the following New York Times headline, which was a direct 
quotation from an FBI news release: "Youths Charged witli Nearly 
Half Major Crimes in '57, the FBI Reports."45 This· headline con-
veyed the erroneous impression that half the murders, thefts, bur-
glaries, and aggravated assaults were attributable to juveniles. It is 
interesting to note that a commentator for The New Yorker ques-
tioned the method of averaging percentage :figures, on which the 
inference of the startling headline was based.46 Subsequently, the 
Advisory Committee took special notice of this article in The New 
Yorker and explained that the misinterpretation of the headline 
was due to failure to refer to the FBI's complete annual report. How-
44. Bennett, A Cool Look at "The Crime Crisis," in A Special Supplement of Har-
per's on Crime and Punishment, Harper's, April 1964, pp. 123-24. 
45. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1958, p. 1. 
46. The New Yorker, May 3, 1958, p. I. 
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ever, no mention of the qualifying statements which appear in the 
annual bulletin had been included in the news release. 
A recently retired executive of Iowa's Commission on Children 
and Youth wrote the following comments criticizing the emphasis 
which the Reports place upon juvenile delinquency: 
Wide publicity was given to the statement that . . . 50% of 
all major crimes were committed by juveniles, and we knew 
flatly and emphatically that it was not so .... Even the State 
Attorney General was making speeches in which he used the 
F.B.I. figures, and so were youth directors of religious education 
of the major religious denominations.47 
This critic also called attention to the hazards of attempting 
to make sweeping statements about juvenile delinquency in view 
of the differing jurisdictions of the police and the juvenile courts 
and the concomitant variations in designating conduct as criminal or 
delinquent. In Iowa, only the general term "delinquency" is used; 
specific offenses cannot be charged in the juvenile court. 
C. Basis for Calculation of Rates 
The two most frequently mentioned criticisms of the Reports 
relate to the geographic areas involved and the population at risk. 
After considering the criticism of the FBI's selection of certain 
geographic units as reporting districts, the Advisory Committee 
recommended the use of tabulations by state and size of city. In 
addition, the Committee suggested that the FBI should follow the 
United States Census Bureau's scheme, which takes account of the 
increasing movements of population from farms to cities and from 
core cities to surrounding urban areas. The FBI accepted this recom-
mendation, and currently tabulates figures in three categories: 
standard metropolitan statistical areas, urban communities (with 
more than 2,500 inhabitants), and rural areas. 
The second persistent criticism involves the population base 
used in calculating the rates. Demographers emphasize the necessity 
of considering the actual population at risk. For example, in cal-
culating birth rates, the base figure for the crude rate is the number 
of women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four. Further 
breakdowns consider current sociological concepts and such charac-
teristics as age at marriage, marital status, religious affiliation, ethnic 
group, education, and the availability and use of contraceptives, all 
of which appear to be associated with family size. Similarly, to 
47. Personal communication to the author. 
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describe the taxonomy of the various forms of crime in more mean-
ingful ways would require implementation of the changes suggested 
below. 
There should be a revision in the method for calculating rates 
for the "under eighteen" and "over eighteen" age gr_oups included 
in the current FBI statistics. Criminal jurisdiction starts where 
juvenile court jurisdiction ends, and the line of demarcation varies 
from state to state. In some states age sixteen is the dividing line, 
and in others it may be seventeen, eighteen, or occasionally as high 
as twenty. Moreover, the upper age limit varies for males and 
females in some courts. Since the sex distribution in both crime and 
delinquency statistics reveals a markedly lower incidence of females 
engaged in criminal activity, except in the categories of sex offenses 
such as prostitution, and some forms of larceny, such as shoplifting, 
the rates should be standardized not only for age but for sex as well. 
Another improvement in the utility of the Reports could be 
achieved if the criteria for the appropriate age to begin assigning 
criminal responsibility to a juvenile's acts corresponded more fully 
than it does at present to periods in the youth's life span when 
changes in his socio-legal status may affect his behavior responses. 
"Adulthood" in reference to military status and voting is relatively 
uniform throughout the country. However, the minimum age for 
obtaining a marriage license or driving license or the age at which 
liquor may be purchased is not uniform in the various states. 
In spite of the FBI's adoption of some of the recommendations 
of the Advisory Committee with respect to geographic areas and the 
use of census data, 48 there is general agreement among critics, both 
official and unofficial, that the basis for calculating crime rates used 
in the Reports still needs major revision. 
D. Use of Crime Clocks 
The crime clock is a special graphic device which each of the 
FBI reports includes to indicate the comparative incidence of Index 
Crimes. In 1964, in the category of crimes against the person, the 
crime clock registered one murder every hour, one robbery, every 
five minutes, and one aggravated assault every three minutes. In the 
category of crimes against property, the clock registered one bur-
glary every twenty-eight seconds, one larceny (fifty dollars and over) 
every forty-five seconds, and one automobile theft every minute. 
48. The Advisory Committee criticized the use of the decennial census figures in 
intercensal years. Their recommendation to substitute the available annual estimates 
by the Bureau of the Census was followed. 
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The crime clock device is intended to dramatize the prevalence 
of serious crime. However, the calculations ignore the population 
at risk. Since the base figures cover an entire year, the numbers of 
offe_nses should be divided by 365 days to represent the chances that 
any one person would be at risk ·of murder, assault, robbery, or any 
other crime in any one community on any day. Utilizing this method, 
rough calculations for murder in 1964 suggest that in the country 
as a whole, the chance of being murdered on any given day is ap-
proximately one in two million. All reports indicate that there is 
much more chance of death by automobile accident than by murder. 
In brief, the inferences drawn by the FBI from its statistics are 
open to serious doubt. The most authoritative criticisms were made 
by the Advisory Committee with respect to the FBI's distinction be-
tween major and minor crime. The apparent overemphasis on juve-
nile crime in the FBI's news releases is deplored by persons familiar 
with local situations. As mentioned above, it was explained by the 
Advisory Committee as failure to take into consideration qualifying 
statements which, unfortunately, do not appear in the press releases. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE REPORTS 
If its statistics are to be "worth the paper they are ·written on," 
the FBI must resolve a three-horned dilemma by satisfying in one 
document the needs of the police, the demands of the general public, 
and the concern of scholars seeking to understand social deviance. 
The FBI's first allegiance is logically to the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police, under whose auspices the present Uniform Crime 
Reporting program was _devised. Its second audience is the general 
public, which through payment of taxes provides the funds for the 
FBI's operation. The public is concerned with the effectiveness of 
the police in protecting life, limb, and property. The third audience 
is composed of representatives of the disciplines of law, social science, 
and social welfare, and this group is interested in the relevance of 
the published data to the understanding, control, and prevention of 
various forms of deviant behavior. To meet the realistic needs of 
each of these three quite different interests, the following suggestions 
are offered regarding the form and tenor of future Uniform Grime 
Reports. 
A. Suggestions for Improving the Form of the Reports 
The first suggestion for improving the form of the Reports re-
lates to geographic coverage. According to the explanatory comments 
in the 1964 Reports, ninety-seven per cent of the larger cities, slightly 
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less than ninety per cent of the other cities, and approximately 
seventy-five per cent of the rural areas are represented. The fu_ture 
push, therefore, should be to persuade more of the rural police juris-
dictions to contribute data. 
The discussion above concerning the current units of count re-
veals lack of uniformity in applying labels49 as well as ·omissions, 
such as the so-called "white collar" crimes.50 Similarly, the present 
basis for distinguishing benveen serious and non-serious crime is 
somewhat ~nsound. To correct these deficiencies, it is suggested that 
Sellin and Wolfgang's design for a crime index merits consideration. 
The hypothesis underlying their scheme is that the present crime 
categories in the Reports conceal the important data about the in-
cidence and severity of criminal acts. In their opinion, the important 
variable is_ the "event," that is, the "content" of a crimina1 act and 
the actors committing it rather than its legal label. Their carefully 
designed manual provides instructions and examples of procedures 
in designating single or combined "events." The manual also con-
tains a sample score sheet which explains how to weight the serious-
ness of the "events." 
Sellin and Wolfgang also advocate other changes in the present 
procedure. First, they recommend excluding from the Reports all 
consensual offenses, all criminal activity in which both parties do 
their best to conceal the behavior (blackmail, narcotic violations, 
gambling, most sex offenses, and criminal abortion), and offenses 
against the public which are discovered only by the activities of the 
police, such as vagrancy and prostitution. The second major recom-
mendation is to base the Crime Index on arrests rather than. the 
current standard of offenses known to the police. The rationale for 
this substitution is that until an arrest is made for at least one viola-
tion of a criminal law, we have no definitive information about the 
facts of the occurrence and the characteristics of the person or persons 
involved. 51 
The foregoing suggestions are not offered as a means for devel-
oping an index of crime in general, but rather as a better basis for 
judging the changes over time in the content and volume of serious 
crime. 
B. Recommendations for the Tenor of Future Reports 
As the Advisory Committee noted, the needs of the FBI and 
police departments should not alone determine the content of the 
49. See discussion in section III(B) supra. 
50. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. 
51. See SELLIN &: WOLFGANG, op. cit. supra note 40: 
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Reports. 52 In fact, the Committee found that there is ·a regrettable 
amount of misinterpretation each time the Reports are released, 
causing unnecessary concern to private and public agencies and to 
individuals about "imaginary problems."53 
In this writer's opinion the misinterpretations occur because 
the publications, instead of being an objective presentation of the 
data, serve as a springboard for frightening the public and blaming 
legal restrictions for failure to prevent further criminal activity 
once the police have apprehended the culprits. Specifically, the first 
message of the Reports to the general public is that people are in 
greater danger than ever before of death from physical attack. How-
ever, as noted in earlier sections of this discussion, 54 the statistics 
themselves do not validate such statements. Traffic accidents, espe-
cially when the driver is under the ·influence of liquor, offer more 
hazards to life and limb. The current legislative efforts to promote 
safer cars and safer drivers reflect recognition of this fact. The second 
message to the public is that the police cannot perform their protec-
tive function effectively because "due process" excludes pre-trial 
evidence obtained by the police. From the point of view of the police, 
this means that culprits are frequently released to continue their 
evil ways. 
The following statement is an example of the language often 
found in the Reports: 
For the law enforcement officer the time-proven deterrents to 
crime are sure detection, swift apprehension and proper punish-
ment. Each is a necessary ingredient. . .. The professional law 
enforcement officer is convinced from experience that the hard-
ened criminal has been and is deterred from killing based on 
the prospect of the death penalty.55 
However, at least one piece of evidence to the contrary was the 
necessity in England of ceasing the practice of hanging convicted 
pickpockets in public, because other pickpockets deftly plied their 
trade among the onlookers gaping at the bodies swinging from the 
gallows. 
In the attempts of the police to deal with crime, pronouncements 
such as those quoted above, irrespective of good intentions, suggest 
that the police are usurping the functions of the judicial and socio-
logical disciplines by dealing with criminal activity in its social 
52. ADVISORY COMM. ON UNIFORM CRIME RECORDS, op. cit. supra note 37, at 13. 
53. Ibid. 
54. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. 
55. 1959 REPORTS 14. 
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rather than its individual aspects. However, a concerted attack on 
overt forms of social deviance in our fast-changing, multi-ethnic 
society requires the understanding and the appropriate functioning 
not only of the police as the front line of defense, but also of the 
judges, lawyers, sociologists, and social work practitioners both in 
and out of court. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In addition to the foregoing suggestions concerning the form 
and tenor of the Reports, we must consider the factors which condi-
tion the nature of communication between the three audiences of the 
Reports and any reasonable steps to improve this communication. 
The police are the first link in the chain of events on which the 
Reports are based. Whether the police are notified that an offense 
has occurred, or whether they are witnesses to its occurrence or are 
called upon to deal with an offender who is caught in the act, the 
action which a police officer takes is the initial force which may 
lead to an arrest and a finding of guilt. To use the terminology of 
the classic Greek drama, the four characters in the drama are the 
accuser, the accused, the victim and the "chorus," in the form of the 
public. Three factors determine how effectively a policeman will 
play this initial role: the police officer's image of himself, the public's 
image of the police, and the suspect's image of the police. 
A police officer's image of himself and his role is based upon a 
complex set of factors involving his basic character structure, his 
personality needs, his class orientation, and his evaluation of the 
demands and attitudes of those who make the laws and man the 
courts. The challenge to a police officer is to reconcile these often 
conflicting needs with his behavior vis-a-vis a suspect. Frequently the 
behavior of a police officer toward a suspect depends on whether the 
suspect is a member of the "ruling class" or a member of a minority 
group living in a ghetto. In the former case the officer will be very 
careful how he proceeds to label a suspect who can afford to protect 
himself with legal counsel. On the other hand, in the latter case 
the suspect is usually unaware that he should make no statements 
which might incriminate him, and he is much more likely to resist 
the police, whom he thinks of only as "the enemy." 
The image of the police as "the unscrupulous enemy" is almost 
universal among suspects who are predominantly, as Judge David 
Bazelon has said, "from the bottom of the socio-economic-cultural 
barrel-from among the ignorant, the ill-educated, the unemployed 
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and often unemployable.''56 All too often the resistive behavior of 
such suspects activates the hostility of the police, and a vicious cycle 
is likely to end with the suspects being labeled as criminals. 
The hostility of the public, and specifically minority group sus-
pects, toward the police probably derives in part from experiences 
with behavior of some police officers which does not accord with 
common standards of honesty and fairness. Cincinnati's Police Chief 
Stanley Schrotel, who is also a member of the Advisory Committee, 
has stated that "the image of the policeman as a totalitarian influence 
in society must be dispelled .... This dispelling is entirely up to us 
policemen."57 In Cincinnati, a policeman who uses any force at all 
in making an arrest must appear with the arrested person before a 
supervisor to explain what happened and why force was necessary. 
There are three ways in which the tarnished image of the police 
may be changed, with a resulting improvement in their status and 
performance. The first recommendation involves instituting a better 
selection process which will weed out candidates for a police force 
whose personality needs include "throwing their weight around." 
Currently, police officers are told to "check their tempers," but it 
might be better to eliminate from the force those officers who have 
uncontrollable tempers. The second recommendation is to raise the 
formal educational requirements for police officers, and the third 
recommendation is to establish better salary scales and promotion 
policies. Together these changes would undoubtedly improve the 
public image of the police and raise police morale and performance 
in both the detection and the prevention of crime. 
Public apathy and public carelessness contribute to the "volcano 
of crime," to use the FBI's characterization of the present situation. 
The extent of offenses against property-burglary, larceny, and 
automobile theft, which according to the Reports account for eighty 
to ninety per cent of all offenses-may in part be a reflection of the 
public's role in failing to provide ordinary precautions to protect 
its property at home, in the office, or on the street. Automobiles are 
frequently borrowed qr stolen because the owners do not take pre-
cautions to lock their cars or to conceal their baggage, which may be 
a temptation for the thief. An educational program to correct these 
tendencies was outlined in a paper presented at a meeting of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science. 68 
56. Address by Judge David L. Bazelon, Law and Order Without Justice, delivered 
Feb. 22, 1966 at the New York Civil Liberties Union Award Luncheon. 
57. See Bowen, Crime in the Cities: An Unnecessary Crisis, Fortune, Dec. 1965, 
pp. 141, 142. 
58. FooNER, THE CARELEss AMERICAN: A STUDY IN AnVEN11TIOUS CRIMINALITY (196!1), 
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A new approach to crime prevention by the police has been 
adopted by the city of Chicago with the support of Mayor Richard 
Daley. Police Chief Orlando W. Wilson (formerly Dean of the School 
· of Criminology of the University of California) emphasizes "aggressive 
preventive patrol."59 Since he believes that the core function of the 
police is not to arrest criminals but rather to prevent crime, he has 
increased the number of patrol cars. In order to expedite the report-
ing of criminal activity, he has installed what is regarded as the most 
advanced police communication system in the world. His program 
is an excellent illustration of what can be done to help the metro-
politan police perform their job more effectively and, incidentally, 
to achieve recognition for it from the public. 
The third audience of the Reports, which is composed of crimin-
ologists, sociologists, and social welfare practitioners, . seeks data 
which will help ferret out the factors associated with the occurrence 
of crime and which will indicate the characteristics of the labeled or 
unlabeled culprit. In their opinion, these data are necessary to ap-
praise the effect of the apprehending and treatment procedures with 
respect to both the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection 
of society. 
Unfortunately, neither the form nor the content of the Reports 
makes any provision for the two antecedent conditions for a scientific 
approach to understanding and dealing effectively with crime. The 
major gap is the absence of a logical taxonomy and a set of tenable 
hypotheses. To guide the FBI in collecting relevant statistical data, 
this writer suggests the appointment of an advisory committee com-
posed of representatives of the sociological, criminological, and social 
welfare practitioners in this field. The first task of such a committee 
would be to propose hypotheses of cause, cure, and prevention and 
to identify them with respect to their relevance to various levels 
of theory. The second task would be to test these hypotheses for 
feasibility in the light of the FBI's available financial and personnel 
resources. The third step would be to determine the relevant data 
and to articulate operational definitions. 
It is to be hoped that Attorney General Katzenbach's Commission 
will, as Judge Bazelon suggests,60 resist the pressure from members 
of various legal associations for more stringent law enforcement, 
especially against disadvantaged minority groups: Judge Bazelon 
apparently agrees with Professor Herbert Wechsler, who, speaking 
59. Bowen, supra note 57, at 141-45, 259. 
60. Bazelon, supra note 56. 
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of the :findings of a former Attorney General's Conference, warned 
that the crime problem ·will not be solved until we identify the 
social and economic roots of the problem.61 The "man in the street" 
may be less impressed by this arduous inquiry than by the FBI 
"numbers game," but ascertaining and striking at the roots of the 
problem are worth much more than crime statistics--even those 
which are worth the paper they are written on. 
61. Wechsler, .t.1. Caveat on Crime Control, 27 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 629, 687 
(1987). 
